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CONGRESSIONAL TERM LIMITS:
UNCONSTITUTIONAL BY INITIATIVE
Abstract: Numerous states are considering voters' initiatives limiting
the terms of their congressional delegations. This Comment analyzes
the constitutionality of these measures and concludes that congressional
term limits are unconstitutional when enacted through voters' initia-
tives, but may be properly enacted through a federal constitutional
amendment. Moreover, imposing term limits at all, regardless of their
implementation, appears inconsistent with original intent of the Consti-
tution's framers. Finally, previous amendments used to implement
changes to the electoral process, and judicial decisions on such proposed
changes, suggest that changes such as term limits must be enacted by
constitutional amendment.
In November 1991, Washington voters turned down Initiative 553,
which would have imposed term limits on both state and federal offi-
cials elected from Washington.' In 1990, Colorado voters passed a
similar measure imposing term limits on its state and federal elected
officials.2 Washington and Colorado are the only states that have
attempted to limit congressional terms? Many states, however, may
soon join them. Congressional term limits are currently under consid-
eration in forty-five states.4 Seventeen of those states could vote on
congressional term limits as early as this November.' Although sup-
port is growing for term limit initiatives, it is not clear that congres-
sional term limits can constitutionally be enacted through voters'
initiatives.6
If term limits are enacted at all, they should be enacted through a
formal amendment to the United States Constitution, rather than by a
1. INrrATIVE MEASURE 553 (Wash., Nov. 5, 1991). Initiative 553 would have forced all
eight of Washington's U.S. Representatives to retire in 1994. David Schaefer, Federal Term
Limits Would Hurt-State Would Be Zero in Congress, Says McDermott, SEATrLE TIMES, Oct.
20, 1991, at BI.
2. AMENDMENT 5 (Colo., Nov. 1990); see Timothy Egan, Building on Mistrust of Officials,
Voters in West Try to Limit Terms, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 23, 1991, at Al. The Colorado courts
have not yet considered the constitutionality of their state's new term limits measure. Id.
3. Egan, supra note 2.
4. Gloria Borger, Can Term Limits Do the Job?, U.S. NEws & WORLD REP., Nov. 11, 1991,
at 34.
5. Id.
6. This Comment will not discuss term limits that afftect only state elected officials. For a
discussion of the issues involved in limits on state officials, see Legislature of California v. March
Fong Eu, 816 P.2d 1309 (Cal. Sup. Ct. 1991), where the California Supreme Court upheld a
voters' initiative imposing term limits on state officials.
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voters' initiative, for three reasons. First, congressional term limits are
inconsistent with the original intent of the delegates at the Constitu-
tional Convention (the Framers), thus raising serious questions about
whether term limits should be enacted by any device other than a con-
stitutional amendment. Second, in the past, when Americans have
imposed major changes on the electoral process, they have used
amendments to implement these changes. Third, courts have prohib-
ited Congress and the states from enacting provisions that bar other-
wise eligible individuals from serving in Congress, unless the
provisions are enacted through a constitutional amendment. This
Comment analyzes the issue of whether congressional term limits
must be enacted by amendment, and concludes that an amendment is
both an appropriate and necessary means for enacting congressional
term limits.
I. THE HISTORY OF TERM LIMITS IN THE UNITED
STATES: FROM THE REVOLUTION TO THE
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION
Although congressional term limits are currently receiving much
public attention, they are not a new idea in American politics. Term
limits were also a popular idea in America just before the Constitu-
tional Convention.7 As this section will demonstrate, however, colo-
nial Americans ultimately concluded that term limits undermined
political leadership, increased instability and corruption within the
states, and restricted voting rights. For these reasons, historian
Gordon Wood concludes that the Framers ultimately rejected con-
gressional term limits at the Constitutional Convention.8
A. The Rise and Fall of Term Limits: 1776-1787
In 1776, prior to the signing of the Declaration of Independence, the
American colonies had begun drafting their own constitutions. Many
of these early constitutions included Radical Whig reforms.9 These
constitutions increased the size of the legislatures, imposed annual
7. GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787 140-41
(1969). According to Wood, term limits "stood as a cardinal tenet of their [American Radical]
Whig faith." Id. at 141.
8. See infra notes 35-37 and accompanying text.
9. The Radical Whigs had been a minor opposition party in England that found great support
in America. Their message was uniquely suited for Americans. WOOD, supra note 7, at 17. The
Radical Whigs had proposed the following reforms for Parliament: shorter sessions, more
representatives, representation by population, and voting instructions from constituents. Id. at
15; James C. Otteson, A Constitutional Analysis of Congressional Term Limits: Improving
Representative Legislation Under the Constitution, 41 DEPAUL L. REv. 1, 8 (1991).
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elections, and attempted to tie representatives closely to their
constituents. 10
Term limits were also included in the early constitutions. Although
not every state enacted term limits, they were a very popular reform in
the 1770s.11 Seven new states imposed term limits on state execu-
tives. 12 Four placed limits on their delegates to the Continental Con-
gress.13 Virginia imposed term limits on its state senators.4
Penhisylvania, a hotbed of Radical Whiggism in the 1770s, set term
limits for all of its elected state officials. 5
Despite the numerous Radical Whig reforms, however, America's
new state and federal governments were mired in instability and cor-
ruption. 6 Many observers, including the individuals who would ulti-
mately meet at the Constitutional Convention, believed that the
political rise of the "non-elite" was causing the problems in the state
and federal governments.1 7 The legislatures, which were increasingly
comprised of the non-elite, were constantly changing the laws to bene-
fit themselves.1 They permitted the confiscation of property, they
devised new paper money schemes, and they suspended the ordinary
means for recovering debts.19 The elite believed that the new laws
benefited the lower classes at the expense of the elite, and at the
expense of a sound commercial economy.20 With so many statutory
changes, it became impossible for the wealthy commercial interests,
10. WOOD, supra note 7, at 165-67, 189.
11. See id. at 140-41.
12. Id. at 140. These seven states were: Delaware, Georgia, Maryland, North Carolina,
Pennsylvania, South Carolina, and Virginia.
13. FRANCIS N. THORPE, THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, COLONIAL
CHARTERS, AND OTHER ORGANIC LAWS OF THE STATES, TERRITORIES, AND COLONIES Now
OR HERETOFORE FORMING THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 1695-97, 2467, 3084-85,
3742-43 (1909). These four states were: Maryland, New Hampshire, Pennsylvania, and
Vermont.
14. Otteson, supra note 9, at 8 n.38.
15. Id; THORPE, supra note 13, at 3084.
16. Otteson, supra note 9, at 9. Instability and corruption refer to the constant statutory
changes made in state legislatures in the 1770s and 1780s. WOOD, supra note 7, at 405.
Corruption also refers to the increase in extortion and profiteering that resulted from the
conspicuous consumption and luxurious lifestyles of the times. IAL at 109. Attorney General
James Iredell provided one colorful reaction to the growing corruption. He called the North
Carolina laws of 1780 "the vilest collection of trash ever formed by a legislative body." Id. at 406
(citing letter from James Iredell to Mrs. Iredell).
17. WOOD, supra note 7, at 397-98, 413-15, 432 (citing letter from Benjamin Franklin to
Charles Carroll, May 25, 1789); Otteson, supra note 9, at 24 n.120 (citing Charles A. Beard).
18. WOOD, supra note 7, at 404-05.
19. Id. at 404.
20. Id. at 404-05 (citing letter from James Madison to Caleb Wallace, Aug. 23, 1785).
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the merchants, the planters, and the professional classes, to plan their
economic futures.21
Eighteenth century commentators22 and twentieth century histori-
ans agree that inadequate leadership was one reason for the instability
and corruption in the states.23 Term limits were a major cause of the
leadership problem. 24 Term limits prevented re-election. Eighteenth
century commentators believed, consequently, that term limits pre-
vented qualified officials from continuing their service in the federal
government.25 As a result, term limits made it relatively easy for
ambitious individuals to find a temporary political office.26 Eventu-
ally, less qualified, non-elite individuals had an opportunity to obtain
public office.27
Consequently, Americans began to question the utility of term lim-
its, and such limits were dropped from a number of state constitu-
tions.28 In 1780, the Massachusetts Constitutional Convention
rejected term limits for the Governor.29 In 1784, Pennsylvania, a state
that had fervently supported term limits, removed all term limit meas-
ures from its constitution.30 These states' actions marked the begin-
ning of an intense reaction against term limits.
31
B. The Demise of Term Limits: The Constitutional Convention
The growing opposition to term limits eventually found its way to
the Constitutional Convention. The Constitutional Convention's first
proposal, the Virginia Plan, originally included congressional term
limits.3 2 The Virginia Plan limited members of the National Legisla-
ture, which eventually became the United States Congress, to one
21. Id.
22. Id. at 397-98 (citing MD. J. (Baltimore), Aug. 3, 1787).
23. Id. at 397-99.
24. Id. at 436.
25. See id at 399, 436-37, 477.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 397, 399.
28. See infra notes 29-31.
29. WOOD, supra note 7, at 436. See generally ELISHA P. DOUGLASS, REBELS AND
DEMOCRATS 187-214 (1955) (recounting the Massachusetts Constitutional Convention).
30. WOOD, supra note 7, at 439-40. The Pennsylvania term limits provisions were eliminated
at the first session of the Council of Censors in the winter of 1783-1784. Id. at 439.
31. After completion of the U.S. Constitution in 1787, states removed some or all term limit
measures that remained in their constitutions. See THORPE, supra note 13, at 781, 788, 1694-97,
1710-11, 1712, 1722, 2466-68, 2486-87, 3084-85, 3093-95, 3742-43, 3758-59. (comparison of
original states' constitutions prior to 1787 and after 1787). However, in more recent times, many
states have imposed term limits on their governors. State courts have upheld these actions. See
State ex reL Maloney v. McCartney, 223 S.E.2d 607 (W. Va. 1976).
32. 1 MAX FARRAND, THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION Of 1787 20 (1937).
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term."3 Although there are no recorded debates on the congressional
term limits measure, the Framers voted unanimously on June 12, 1787
to reject congressional term limits.34
Gordon Wood cites three primary explanations for the Framers'
rejection of term limits. First, the Framers believed that term limits
reduced the quality of the candidates by forcing qualified individuals
out of office and making room for less qualified, non-elite officials.35
Second, the Framers believed that since term limits were helping the
non-elite to control the state legislatures, term limits were increasing
instability and corruption in the country. 36 Third, the public felt that
term limits violated their right to vote because term limits prevented
them from voting for the candidate of their choice.37
The Framers hoped to remedy the problems in the state and federal
governments with an elitist representational federal government.38
The Framers believed that a successful government needed elected
officials with confidence, authority, experience, intelligence, and "nat-
ural social influence."39 They wanted to create a government that
would filter out the non-elite who did not possess these qualities.'
Term limits made it easier for the non-elite to find positions in the
federal government. Term limits were, therefore, incompatible with
the Framers' political philosophy, and the Framers consciously
33. Id.
34. Id. at 217; SUPPLEMENT TO MAX FARRAND'S THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL
CONVENTION OF 1787 71 (James H. Hutson ed., 1987).
35. See WOOD, supra note 7, at 398-99, 436-38, 477. Wood describes the Framers'
frustration with term limits because of term limits' affect on the quality of elected officials. Term
limits required annual elections where new people came into the state government. These
constant elections made it impossible for officials to gain experience and made it more likely that
the non-elite could overwhelm the elite in the legislature.
36. See id. at 436-37, 467, 477, 510-11.
37. Id. at 439.
38. Id. at 517.
39. Id. at 508.
40. See generally id. at 506-18. See also THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison). In the
words of Michael Parenti:
[Tihe delegates repeatedly stated their intention to erect a government strong enough to
protect the haves from the have-nots. They gave voice to the crassest class prejudices and
never found it necessary to disguise the fact-as have latter-day apologists-that their
uppermost concern was to diminish popular control and resist all tendencies toward class
equalization ....
Michael Parenti, The Constitution as an Elitist Document. in How DEMOCRATIC Is THE CON-
sTrntrlToN? 52 (Robert A. Goldwin & William A. Schambra eds., 1980).
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decided not to place term limits on any elected positions in the
government.4'
C. The Constitutional Provisions Relating to Term Limits
The text that the Framers finally adopted, the Constitution, con-
tains three provisions pertinent to a discussion of congressional term
limits: the Qualifications Clause for United States Representatives; the
Qualifications Clause for United States Senators; and the local elec-
tions power. The Qualifications Clause for United States Representa-
tives requires that all Representatives be at least twenty-five years of
age, a citizen of the United States for at least seven years, and a resi-
dent of the state represented in Congress.42 The Qualifications Clause
for Senators uses similar language to establish the qualifications for
United States Senators.43 The local elections power gives the states
the power to regulate the time, place and manner of their local con-
gressional elections.'
D. Using Original Intent in Constitutional Interpretation
One way of interpreting the Constitution is to examine the original
intent of the Framers. This method has won limited acceptance in the
legal community, particularly among conservative scholars who prefer
original intent analysis to an analysis that interprets the Constitution
in accord with contemporary values.4" Advocates of original intent
claim that because original intent relies on well-established legal prin-
ciples rather than contemporary values, it minimizes judges' personal
biases and produces more neutral results than analysis that relies on
contemporary values.46 Consequently, these scholars argue that any
clear departure from original intent demands close judicial scrutiny
41. See generally WooD, supra note 7, at 520-21. Unlike congressional term limits, there
were extensive debates about presidential term limits, which ware also rejected at the
Constitutional Convention. 1 FERRAND, supra note 32, at 68-69; 2 id. at 108-15, 493, 500-03.
42. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 2.
43. Id. at § 3, cl. 3. For a United States Senator, the minimum age is thirty and the minimum
period of citizenship is nine years.
44. Id. at § 4, cI. 1. Article V also will be indirectly referred to in this Comment. Article V
establishes the means of amending the Constitution. It requires a two-thirds vote from both
houses of Congress or a Convention of two-thirds of the state legislatures in order to propose an
amendment. After the amendment is proposed, three-fourths of the state legislatures, or a
Convention of three-fourths of the states, must ratify the amendment. Id. at art. V.
45. See, eg., Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47
IND. L.J. 1, 8 (1971); Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CN. L. REv. 849,
862-65 (1989).
46. See Bork, supra note 45, at 1-20. But see Mark Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid Down:
A Critique of Interpretivism and Neutral Principles, 96 HARV. L. REV. 781, 787-94 (1983).
420
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and may require a constitutional amendment to enact the proposed
change.47
When using original intent to interpret the Constitution, scholars
suggest that the analyst first look to the text of the Constitution, the
history, and the political practice of the colonial period.48 Ideally, the
text, history, and political practice will clarify the Framers' intent, and
thereby provide the answer to a contemporary constitutional question.
Unfortunately, many contemporary issues were inconceivable in 1787.
In these cases, the analyst must attempt to derive constitutional rights
or limits from the governmental processes established by the Constitu-
tion.49 Advocates and critics of original intent analysis agree that
deriving general constitutional rights or limits from the Constitution's
governmental processes is more problematic than deriving those same
rights or limits from the text of the Constitution, the history, and the
political practice.50 When evaluating term limits, however, Constitu-
tional text, history, and political practice are available to the analyst.
II. TWENTIETH CENTURY CONSIDERATIONS OF TERM
LIMITS AND RELATED RESTRICTIONS ON
ELIGIBILITY FOR OFFICE
Since 1787, there has been little discussion of congressional term
limits; congressional term limits have only captured public attention
within the last twenty years.51 Congress, the state legislatures, and the
courts have, however, discussed other measures that are pertinent to a
discussion of congressional term limits. Congress and the state legisla-
tures have approved the Twenty-Second, Twelfth, and Seventeenth
Amendments. These amendments affect terms of office and qualifica-
tions for elected federal officials, and more generally, the American
electoral process.52 The courts, although they have not yet analyzed
the constitutionality of the congressional term limit initiatives,53 have
considered the constitutionality of other restrictions on eligibility that
can be compared with term limits. In particular, they have decided a
47. Scalia, supra note 45, at 862.
48. Bork, supra note 45, at 17-18.
49. Id. at 17.
50. Id. at 18-19.
51. Otteson, supra note 9, at 24-25 n.122-24.
52. See infra notes 58-60, 64-67 and accompanying text.
53. In Washington, opponents of Initiative 553 asked the Washington Supreme Court to
prohibit the initiative from appearing on the November 1991 ballot. The court refused because
the issue would not be ripe for consideration unless it prevailed in the election. League of Women
Voters v. Ralph Munro, No. 58438-9 (Wash., Sept. 3, 1991) (denying petitioners' request).
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number of cases regarding the constitutionality of so-called 'resign and
run' amendments.54
A. Constitutional Amendments Affecting Terms or Qualifications of
Federal Officials
The Twenty-Second, Twelfth, and Seventeenth Amendments made
fundamental changes in the Constitution and the American electoral
process.15 The Twenty-Second Amendment limits presidents to two
terms,56 and demonstrates one way that federal term limits have been
enacted. The Twelfth Amendment separates the Vice-President's elec-
tion from the President's election. The Seventeenth Amendment pro-
vides for the popular election of United States Senators.
Congress proposed the Twenty-Second Amendment to the states on
March 24, 1947. 51 Many members of Congress agreed that presiden-
tial term limits made a fundamental change in the Constitution. 8
Term limits prevented Americans from voting for the candidate of
their choice.59 Consequently, it changed* the nature of presidential
electoral politics in America.' Nevertheless, Congress determined
that presidential term limits could be enacted if presidential term lim-
its received public support.61 Congress also determined that the ratifi-
cation process was an adequate way to achieve public consent.62
Consequently, Congress concluded that presidential term limits could
be accomplished by an amendment to the Constitution.63
54. These amendments require individuals on the bench and/or in elected positions to resign
from that position before running for Congress. See infra notes 93-95, 101-05.
55. See infra notes 58-60, 68-70.
56. U.S. CoNST. amend. XXII; id at art. II, § 1, cl. 5 (provides the original requirements for
the President of the United States).
57. THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: ANALYSIS AND
INTERPRETATION 39 n.14 (Johnny H. Killian ed., 1987).
58. 93 CONG. REc. 844-46, 848 (1947) (statements of Reps. Halleck, Rayburn & Springer).
The Twenty-Second Amendment opponents argued that term limits were too fundamental a
change to consider in an amendment. Id.
59. Id at 844 (statements of Reps. McCormack & Halleck). Although Mr. McCormack and
Mr. Halleck had opposite views of presidential term limits both agreed that they change citizens'
voting rights.
60. Id. at 845 (statement of Rep. Rayburn). Mr. Rayburn contenied that presidential term
limits would change electoral politics and undermine representative democracy in the United
States.
61. Id. (statement of Rep. Springer). Mr. Springer did not explain why term limits required
public consent; Springer's conclusion may rest on the constitution-l ideal of consent of the
governed.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 844, 846.
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Two other constitutional amendments-the Twelfth and Seven-
teenth Amendments-also changed the American electoral process.
Prior to the Twelfth Amendment, the Constitution stipulated that the
presidential candidate who received the second largest number of
votes in the electoral college would become the Vice-President." The
Twelfth Amendment makes the Vice-President's election technically
independent of the President's election.65 In reality, the Amendment
links the Vice-President to the President, because the Vice-President is
chosen by the President or the President's political party.
Similarly, the Seventeenth Amendment changed the electoral pro-
cess by instituting the direct election of United States Senators.66
Prior to the Seventeenth Amendment, the Constitution required that
each state legislature elect the two United States Senators from its
state.67
Congress proposed the Twelfth Amendment in 1803 and the Seven-
teenth Amendment more than one-hundred years later in 1912.68
Despite the intervening period between proposed amendments, similar
arguments were made during the respective congressional debates.69
In both debates, members expressed their belief that the amendments
were changing more than just the plain text of the Constitution; these
amendments were changing the structure and balance of power in the
Constitution.70 For example, during debate over the Twelfth Amend-
ment, members argued that the Amendment changed the delicate bal-
ance between the large states and the small states.71 They claimed that
the amendment made vice-presidential elections more like a straight
popular election, which benefited the large states, and less like a feder-
ative election, which benefited the small states.72 During the debate
on the Seventeenth Amendment, members contended that it changed
64. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 3.
65. Id. at amend. XII.
66. Id at amend. XVII.
67. Id at art. I, § 3, cl. 1.
68. 48 CONG. Rrc. 6367 (1912) (noting the House vote on the Seventeenth Amendment); see
3 ABRIDGEMENT OF THE DEBATES OF CONGRESS, FROM 1789 To 1856 37 (New York, D.
Appleton & Company 1857) (noting the Senate vote on the Twelfth Amendment).
69. See infra notes 71-74.
70. See infra notes 71-74.
71. See ABRIDGEMENT, supra note 68, at 30-33. In the words of Senator Uriah Tracy:
"[Tihe resolution before us contains principles which have a manifest tendency to deprive the
small States of an important right, secured to them by a solemn and constitutional compact, and
to vest an overwhelming power in the great States." Id. at 30.
72. Id.
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the balance between the federal and state governments.7" Effectively,
this meant that regardless of size, it reduced all states' power because
the state legislatures no longer controlled Senate elections.74
B. Congressionally Imposed and State Imposed Eligibility
Restrictions on Federal Officials: Judicial Scrutiny
Although the courts have not decided the constitutionality of con-
gressional term limits, they have decided the constitutionality of other
restrictions on congressional eligibility.75 Both Congress and the
states have enacted eligibility restrictions. 76 The cases discussed below
analyze the constitutionality of these types of eligibility restrictions.
In each of these cases, the courts first addressed whether the restric-
tion, in fact, constituted an addition to the Congressional Qualifica-
tions Clauses. If the court concluded that the restriction was an
addition to the Qualifications Clauses, then the court found the restric-
tion unacceptable unless it had been formally amended to the
Constitution.
1. Congressionally Imposed Eligibility Restrictions Rejected by the
Supreme Court: Powell v. McCormack
In 1967, the House of Representatives attempted to prevent Repre-
sentative Adam Clayton Powell from taking his seat in Congress.77 A
Special Subcommittee on Contracts found that he had abused his
authority while serving as Chairman of the House Committee on Edu-
cation and Labor. 8 Powell had allegedly misused his travel expense
privileges and had arranged an illegal salary for his wife. 7 9 Based on
these findings, House Speaker John McCormack introduced House
Resolution Number 278 (H.R. 278) to prevent Powell from taking his
seat. The measure passed by a majority, and Powell was excluded
from Congress. 80
73. 48 CONG. REc. 6362-63 (1912). In describing the resolution, Representative Saunders
said: "This is a matter of fundamental power, of fundamental relation between the States and the
Nation, and the language by which this power is conveyed, and this relation is established, is
vague, and indefinite." Id at 6363.
74. Id.
75. See infra notes 93-95, 101-05.
76. ARIz. CONST. art. 22, § 18; Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 492-93 (1969); see H.R.
Res. 278, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1967); see also infra notes 94, 102-05.
77. Powell, 395 U.S. at 492-93.
78. Id. at 489-90.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 492-93.
424
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Powell challenged the validity of H.R. 278. The Supreme Court, in
Powell v. McCormack81 held that Congress had exceeded its right to
exclude its members when it enacted H.R. 278. The Court found that
the resolution made congressional approval of one's ethical behavior a
criteria for serving in Congress.82 A congressional ethics test does not
appear in the Congressional Qualifications Clause. Yet, the ethics test
prevented Powell from serving in Congress. The Court concluded,
therefore, that the ethics test constituted an addition to the House
Qualifications Clause.8" The Court held that Congress did not have
the authority to exclude duly-elected United States Representatives,
unless the Representative-elect did not satisfy the requirements enu-
merated in the Qualifications Clause.84 The Court, therefore, struck
down H.R. 278 as unconstitutional.85
In reaching its decision, the Supreme Court looked at eighteenth
century history and political practices, and at the Framers' philoso-
phy.86 The Court concluded that the Framers intended to limit the
voters' choice of candidates as little as possible.8 Therefore, the
Framers limited Congress' power to exclude its members,88 and they
set minimal eligibility requirements in the Congressional Qualifica-
tions Clauses. 89 The Court found that allowing Congress to exclude
members for reasons other than those specified in the Qualifications
Clause was inconsistent with the Framers' original intent.90 Based on
this inconsistency, the Court struck down H.R. 278.
2. State Imposed Eligibility Restrictions: The Courts Are Split Over
Resign and Run Provisions
"Resign and run" provisions require public officials to resign from
one post before running for another elected position.91 Conversely,
they prevent officials who refuse to leave their current post from run-
ning for other offices. The cases below demonstrate two different
views of the constitutionality of these provisions. The first group of
81. Id. at 550.
82. Id. at 520-22.
83. Id. at 522.
84. Id. at 522, 550.
85. Id. at 550.
86. See id. at 520-47 (describes the way in which the Court determined the Framers' original
intent).
87. Id. at 532-34.
88. Id. at 547.
89. Id. at 543, 547-48.
90. Id.
91. See infra notes 93-95, 101-05.
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cases prohibits resign and run provisions, and the second group of
cases permits resign and run provisions.
a. Cases Prohibiting Resign and Run Provisions: State ex rel.
Wettengel v. Zimmerman
Just as Powell invalidated a congressional attempt to modify the
Qualifications Clause,92 so the courts in Wisconsin,93 Washington,94
and Hawaii9" have struck down state resign and run provisions
because they modify the Congressional Qualifications Clauses. Repre-
sentative of these cases is the 1946 case, State ex rel. Wettengel v. Zim-
merman.96 In Wettengel, the Wisconsin Supreme Court struck down
an amendment to the Wisconsin Constitution that prohibited judges
from holding any public office except a judicial office. A Wisconsin
circuit judge, Joseph R. McCarthy, challenged the constitutionality of
the amendment because it prevented him from running for the United
States Senate.97 The court found that the Wisconsin amendment con-
stituted a qualification because it disqualified certain individuals, in
this case judges, from attempting to serve in Ccngress.98 The court
held that because membership in Congress is established by the United
States Constitution, only the United States Constitution, and not the
Wisconsin Constitution, can set the qualifications for these positions.99
The court, therefore, rejected the amendment. Azcording to Wetten-
gel, if a candidate fulfills the criteria enumerated in the United States
Constitution, then a state cannot impede that person's candidacy
either by a statute or by an amendment to its constitution.1°°
92. See supra notes 83-85.
93. State ex rel Wettengel v. Zimmerman, 24 N.W.2d 504 (Wis. 1946).
94. In State ex rel. Chandler v. Howell, 104 Wash. 99, 175 P. 569, 570 (1918), the
Washington Supreme Court struck down an amendment to the W-shington Constitution that
prohibited judges from running for Congress. The court found that by forcing the judge to
resign, the state constitution added criteria to the Qualifications Clause.
95. In Cobb v. State, 722 P.2d 1032, 1033-34 (Haw. 1986), the Hawaii Supreme Court
avoided addressing the federal constitutional issue. The court held that an amendment to the
Hawaii Constitution that prohibited incumbent officials from maintaining their positions while
running for another position did not apply to candidates for federal positions.
96. 24 N.W.2d 504 (Wis. 1946).
97. Id.
98. Id. at 508.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 508-09.
426
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b. Cases Permitting Resign and Run Provisions: Joyner v. Mofford
Courts in Arizona,10 1 California, 102 Pennsylvania, 1 3 New York,"°
and Oklahoma, 105 on the other hand, have upheld state resign and run
provisions. These courts have found that these provisions are an
acceptable exercise of the states' constitutional power to regulate their
local congressional elections. The decision of the Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals in Joyner v. Mofford 106 best illustrates the reasoning behind
these decisions.
In Joyner, the Ninth Circuit upheld the constitutionality of an
amendment to the Arizona Constitution that prohibited an incumbent
in a salaried elective office from running for another salaried local,
state or federal office, except in the final year of the incumbent's
term. 0 7 The amendment required that a candidate resign from any
elected post before running for Congress. The court found that the
amendment fell within the state's constitutional power to regulate the
time, place, and manner of its congressional elections.108 The court
recognized that although the resignation requirement placed an indi-
rect burden on potential candidates for Congress, the burden did not
constitute a qualification because it did not bar a candidate from run-
ning for Congress. 109 The court noted that if the amendment totally
barred a candidate from serving in Congress, then it would have vio-
lated the Qualifications Clause. 1 In such a case, the court implied
that it would have struck down the amendment. 1
101. Joyner v. Mofford, 706 F.2d 1523 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1002 (1983).
102. Alex v. County of Los Angeles, 35 Cal. App. 3d 994, 111 Cal. Rptr. 285 (1973)
(upholding a California law that required judges to take a leave of absence if they run for public
offices).
103. Adams v. Supreme Ct. of Pa., 502 F. Supp. 1282 (M.D. Pa. 1980) (upholding a
Pennsylvania law that required state judges to resign before running for Congress).
104. Signorelli v. Evans, 637 F.2d 853 (2d Cir. 1980) (upholding a New York law that
required state judges to resign from the judiciary before running for political office).
105. Oklahoma State Election Bd. v. Coats, 610 P.2d 776 (Okla. 1980) (upholding an
Oklahoma law that forbids district attorneys from running for an office that overlapped their
term of service).
106. 706 F.2d 1523 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1002 (1983).
107. Id. at 1528.
108. Id; see U.S. CONsT. art. 1, § 4, cl. 1.
109. Joyner, 706 F.2d at 1528, 1531.
110. Id. at 1528. Similarly, the courts have upheld state provisions prohibiting convicted
felons from running for Congress. However, these cases have not considered whether these
provisions implicate the Congressional Qualifications Clauses. See Wilson v. Goodwyn, 522 F.
Supp. 1214 (E.D.N.C. 1981).
111. Joyner, 706 F.2d at 1528, 1531.
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III. MODERN TERM LIMIT PROPOSALS:
UNCONSTITUTIONAL BY VOTERS' INITIATIVE,
CONSTITUTIONAL BY AMENDMENT
Courts should reject voters' initiatives that impose term limits on
members of Congress. Term limits should only be enacted by amend-
ing the United States Constitution. Three grounds of analysis support
this conclusion. First, term limits do not reflect the Framers' original
intent. Therefore, they raise the possibility that a constitutional
amendment is required for their enactment. Second, prior constitu-
tional amendments affecting federal elections support the conclusion
that an amendment is an appropriate way to implement congressional
term limits. Third, judicial decisions have held that term limits mod-
ify the Constitution's Qualifications Clause and, as such, can only be
enacted through a federal constitutional amendment.
A. Term Limits are Inconsistent with the Framer's Original Intent:
Raising the Prospect of Constitutional Amendment
Original intent analysis enjoys some support among conservative
scholars, but original intent can be difficult to ascertain.1 2 Where
original intent is ascertainable, any departure from original intent
poses a serious question about whether that departure should be
enacted by constitutional amendment. A departure from original
intent can imply a change in one of the Constitution's fundamental
values. Consequently, advocates of original intent claim that any clear
departure from original intent must be enacted by amendment.113 It is
easiest to ascertain original intent when the text of the Constitution,
the history surrounding the particular provision, the eighteenth cen-
tury political practices and Framers' philosophy point to one clear
conclusion." 4 This section proposes that all four of the factors above
demonstrate that congressional term limits are inconsistent with the
Framers' original intent.
The text of the Constitution is the least helpful of the four factors.
The text does not include term limits, but it also does not specifically
prohibit them. This textual shortcoming, however, is not fatal to this
analysis. In Powell, the text alone also did not reveal the Framers'
intent. The text of the Constitution does not specifically prohibit Con-
112. See generally Tushnet, supra note 46.
113. See supra note 47.
114. See supra note 48 and accompanying text. Even where the intent is clear, however, it
does not always control the decision as to constitutionality. For example, the Framers rejected a
national bank, but a national bank was, nevertheless, implemented early in the nineteenth
century. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
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gress from expelling its members for ethical misconduct. As a result,
the Court used eighteenth century history and political practice, and
the Framers' philosophy to determine the constitutionality of Con-
gress' actions.115 Likewise, because the Framers' intent on term limits
is unclear from the text of the Constitution, analysts should look at
eighteenth century history and political practice and the Framers' phi-
losophy to determine the constitutionality of congressional term limit
initiatives.
Eighteenth century history reveals that Americans considered term
limits a failed experiment. 1 6 Initially, term limits appealled to the
early Americans; they were consistent with the other Radical Whig
reforms that the Americans were implementing in their new coun-
try. 1 7 Ultimately, however, Americans thought that term limits were
only increasing their nation's problems. 1 8
By the time of the Constitutional Convention, term limits had fallen
into disfavor, and were no longer the common political practice in the
states. 1 9 Prior to the Constitutional Convention, Massachusetts and
Pennsylvania had already removed the term limits provisions that had
appeared in their constitutions. 20 The Framers followed these states'
examples. Not only did the Framers unanimously reject congressional
term limits, they also rejected all the other term limits on elected fed-
eral officials that were proposed at the Convention. 21
Congressional term limits are also inconsistent with the Framers'
philosophy. The Framers were attempting to create an elitist federal
government that would filter out the non-elite candidates.' 22 Term
limits were inconsistent with this goal because such limits made it eas-
ier for the non-elite to obtain positions in the federal government
through greater turnover among officeholders. 23 The Framers also
thought that government was a sophisticated science that required offi-
115. See supra note 84.
116. See supra notes 22-24, 28.
117. See supra note 9.
118. See supra notes 22-24, 28 and accompanying text.
119. See supra notes 28-31 and accompanying text.
120. See supra notes 29-30.
121. See supra note 41.
122. See supra notes 38-40 and accompanying text.
123. See supra notes 25-26, 35 and accompanying text. If enacted today, term limits may
have the same result. Congressional expert Norman Ornstein contends that term limits might
increase the "corrupting" ambition in Congress. He claims that members will try to parlay their
positions in Congress into post-Congress positions as lobbyists. The members will be more
concerned with securing their personal future than with producing sound national policy.
Borger, supra note 4, at 35 (quoting Ornstein).
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cials who possessed superior knowledge and experience. 124 Term lim-
its encouraged part-time politicians, making it impossible for
individuals to gain the experience that the Framers thought was neces-
sary to govern well. 125
Using the criteria set out by original intent advocates and the Powell
Court, it appears that the Framers intended to prevent the adoption of
term limits as part of the Constitution. The Framers did not simply
leave term limits out of the Constitution to be determined at some
future date. Rather, they expressly rejected the adoption of term lim-
its. History, prevailing political philosophy and the Framers' philoso-
phy all point to a rejection of term limits. In Powell, the Court struck
down the congressional ethics test because it was inconsistent with the
eighteenth century history and political practice, and the Framers'
philosophy. Therefore, under Powell, congressional term limit initia-
tives should also be struck down because they are inconsistent with
eighteenth century history and political practice, and the Framers'
philosophy.
Under Powell, it was inappropriate for Congress to impose an ethics
test on its members. This problem could have been remedied, how-
ever, if the Congressional Qualifications Clauses had been amended to
include ethical criteria. Likewise, congressional term limits would be
acceptable if adopted by amendment. Although original intent advo-
cates might claim that congressional term limits make such fundamen-
tal changes in the Constitution that they require an amendment, 126 it
is not clear that all observers would conclude that original intent man-
dates an amendment in this case. Nevertheless, congressional term
limits bring original intent into question and thereby warrant an
amendment.
B. Past Practice for Term Limits: Constitutional Amendment
Although original intent only suggests that an amendment might be
necessary to enact congressional term limits, past amendments
strengthen the argument favoring a constitutional amendment. The
Twenty-Second, Twelfth, and Seventeenth Amendments suggest that
an amendment is the appropriate way to enact congressional term lim-
its. These amendments all made major changes in the American elec-
toral process. Congressional term limits will make comparable
124. See supra note 39.
125. See supra notes 25-26, 35 and accompanying text.
126. See supra note 47.
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changes.127 Therefore, these past amendments suggest that an amend-
ment is the appropriate way to enact congressional term limits.
According to former Chief Justice Warren Burger, presidential term
limits and congressional term limits are sufficiently similar that their
enactments should both be treated the same way.1 2 1 Presidential and
congressional term limits are similar in two ways. First, the Constitu-
tion's Qualifications Clauses for both the President and Congress set
very minimal criteria for candidates in both positions.1 29 As a result,
in both cases, term limits add a major new eligibility requirement to
these positions. Under term limits, candidates would not only have to
meet the age, citizenship, and residency requirements, they would also
have to meet the term limit requirement.1 30
Second, in 1947, Congress concluded that because presidential term
limits were making such a fundamental change in the Constitution and
the electoral process, the amendment required public consent.31 Con-
gress believed that the ratification process provided a suitable way for
determining public consent. 32 Congressional term limits present as
serious a change in the Constitution and the electoral process as presi-
dential term limits. Congressional term limits deny voters the right to
vote for candidates who satisfy the Congressional Qualifications
Clauses, just as presidential term limits deny voters the right to vote
for candidates who satisfy the Presidential Qualifications Clause. 33
Therefore, because an amendment was used to enact presidential term
limits, an amendment is also the appropriate way to enact congres-
sional term limits.
The Twenty-Second Amendment, by itself, does not prove that a
constitutional amendment is the only way to enact term limits. When
127. There are many ways that term limits could change the federal government. For
example, term limits could substantially change the seniority system, the committee system, and
the leadership in Congress. In addition, term limits could change the blance of power between
Congress and the President. Term limits could reduce members' experience with and knowledge
of many complex issues facing Congress, making Congress a less effective check on the executive
branch than it is currently. Borger, supra note 4, at 35-36. See generally Otteson, supra note 9,
at 31-32; Steven R. Greenberger, Democracy and Congressional Tenure, 41 DEPAUL L. REv. 37,
53-55 (1991).
128. Warren Burger, Address at the National Press Club (Nov. 12, 1991), available in
LEXIS, Nexis Library, Current File.
129. See supra notes 42-43 and accompanying text. A presidential candidate must be a
natural-born citizen, must be at least thirty-five years old, and must be at least a fourteen-year
resident of the United States. U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 1, cl. 5.
130. But see infra notes 141-42, 145-46, 149-50 and accompanying text, discussing whether
term limits are properly characterized as qualifications.
131. See supra notes 58-62 and accompanying text.
132. 93 CONG. REc. 845-46 (1947) (statement of Rep. Springer).
133. See supra notes 37, 129 and accompanying text.
Washington Law Review
other constitutional amendments are considered, however, it appears
more likely that an amendment is the only appropriate way of impos-
ing term limits on members of Congress. The Twelfth and Seven-
teenth Amendments changed provisions of the original Constitution
affecting elections of Vice-Presidents and Senators, respectively. The
only way to change explicit constitutional text is through an amend-
ment. These amendments, however, changed more than just the text
of the Constitution, they changed the balance of power within the con-
stitutionally established federal government, and they changed the
American electoral process."'
Although term limits initiatives would not change the actual text of
the Constitution, congressional term limits would effectively change
the Congressional Qualifications Clauses. Term limits would add a
fourth qualification for candidacy, and thereby prohibit many individ-
uals from serving in Congress who would otherwise be eligible. 13 -
Term limits will also change the fundamental balance of power
between the President and Congress. With term limits, Congress may
no longer be able to effectively check the President's power.136 The
Twelfth and Seventeenth Amendments also each changed a fundamen-
tal balance of power in the Constitution. The Twelfth Amendment
changed the balance between large and small states, and the Seven-
teenth Amendment changed the balance between the federal and state
governments. 137
Congressional term limits also will change the American electoral
process. 138 If nothing more, term limits will prohibit many powerful
congressional leaders from running for re-election.' 39  Because an
amendment was appropriate to change the balance of power and the
electoral process in the Twelfth and Seventeenth Amendments, an
amendment probably is the only appropriate way to impose the
changes in power and the electoral process that may result from con-
gressional term limits.1"
134. See supra notes 64-66, 69.
135. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
136. See supra note 127.
137. See supra notes 70-73 and accompanying text.
138. See supra notes 123, 127 and accompanying text. These note3 show how term limits will
influence the federal government directly, and thereby indirectly influence the electoral process.
Changes in congressional ambition, supra note 123, and congressional structure and leadership,
supra note 127, will influence who runs for Congress and who we elect to Congress when term
limits are enacted.
139. Borger, supra note 4, at 35.
140. Former Chief Justice Warren Burger has said that the changes caused by congressional
term limits seem similar enough to the changes wrought by popular election of Senators that
term limits should be enacted by amendment. See supra note 128.
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The Twenty-Second, Twelfth, and Seventeenth Amendments did
more than just change the text of the Constitution. Like congressional
term limits, these amendments changed the fundamental balances of
power and the electoral process that were originally established by the
Constitution. Given these past amendments, an amendment appears
to be the appropriate way, if not the only way, to enact congressional
term limits.
C. The Necessary Way to Enact Term Limits: Constitutional
Amendment
A constitutional amendment, however, is more than just the appro-
priate means of enacting congressional term limits, it may also be the
only way to enact term limits. The cases discussed earlier suggest that
congressional term limits will be characterized by the courts as an
amendment to the Congressional Qualifications Clauses because they
place a fourth qualification on candidates for Congress. Consequently,
unless congressional term limits are added to Congressional Qualifica-
tions Clauses by constitutional amendment, they likely will be struck
down as unconstitutional.
1. The Supreme Court: Congress Cannot Make Additions to the
Congressional Qualifications Clauses
The Supreme Court, in Powell v. McCormack 4  held that it is
unconstitutional for Congress to exclude its members for any reason
other than the member's failure to meet the three criteria of the Quali-
fications Clause. 42 Like the congressional ethics test in Powell, term
limits impose an additional qualification on members of Congress.
Under term limits, when an official reaches the term limit, the official
is prohibited from running for re-election. Term limits will thereby
disqualify individuals from serving in Congress who meet all of the
Qualifications Clause criteria. Therefore, under Powell, term limits
will constitute a qualification.
According to Powell, this additional qualification is only acceptable
if it is added to the Constitution by amendment.143 Term limit initia-
tives, like the congressional action in Powell, do not comply with the
constitutional amendment process set out in Article V.1' Therefore,
141. 395 U.S. at 486 (1968).
142. Id. at 547-48.
143. Id. at 522. Powell only considers the powers of Congress and not those of the states.
The Courts' characterization of what qualifications are, however, is instructive for analysis of
states' power.
144. See supra note 44.
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under Powell, the courts likely will strike down congressional term
limit initiatives as an unconstitutional modification of the Qualifica-
tions Clause.
2. State Actions Restricting Candidates: Complete Bars on
Candidacy are Unconstitutional
No court has yet decided on the constitutionality of state-imposed
congressional term limits. Therefore, to determine their constitution-
ality, the analyst must look to other state actions that raise similar
issues. Resign and run provisions raise many of these same issues
about the Congressional Qualifications Clauses and the states' power
to regulate the time, place and manner of elections. These provisions
prevent officials who refuse to leave their current post from running
for office. Although courts have reached differing conclusions as to
the constitutionality of resign and run amendments, they have agreed
that any provision completely barring certain candidates from serving
in Congress is unconstitutional.
Cases in Wisconsin, Washington, and Hawaii, have rejected resign
and run amendments altogether.145 These courts have found that res-
ignation requirements constitute an additional qualification to the
Congressional Qualifications Clauses.1 Similarly, congressional term
limits impose a qualification outside of the Congressional Qualifica-
tions Clause, and the above courts would strike them down as
unconstitutional. 147
Cases in Pennsylvania, New York, Oklahoma, California and Ari-
zona have upheld state actions that require elected officials to resign
their current posts before running for a federal position. 148 The courts
justify these measures as an exercise of the states' power to regulate
congressional elections.149
Some observers might suggest that the cases permitting resign and
run requirements also make term limits permissible. They might
argue that term limit initiatives are state actions, like resign and run
amendments, in which the state is simply regulating the time, place,
and manner of elections. These cases, however, do not support term
limits. For example, in Joyner, the court specifically noted that if the
Arizona amendment had totally barred certain candidates from run-
ning for Congress, then the amendment would have constituted an
145. See supra notes 93-95.
146. See supra notes 94, 95, 98-100 and accompanying text.
147. See supra note 94, 95, 98-100 and accompanying text.
148. See supra notes 101-05.
149. See, e.g., supra notes 101-05.
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additional qualification for serving in Congress.15° In such a case, the
court implied it would have struck down the amendment."'
Congressional term limits would completely bar some candidates
from serving in Congress. Unlike resign and run provisions where
candidates can, through their own acts, attain eligibility for Congress,
term limits create an impediment to eligibility that candidates are
powerless to overcome. Powell and Joyner both hold that any provi-
sion that disqualifies individuals from Congress constitutes an addi-
tional qualification of the Qualification Clauses."5 2 Under these cases,
therefore, term limits constitute an additional qualification.
Powell and Joyner also hold that additional qualifications for federal
office are unconstitutional.' 53 Therefore, because term limit initiatives
effectively amend the Qualifications Clause, they are unconstitutional.
A constitutional amendment is the only way that these provisions can
be enacted.
These two groups of cases reach different results on the constitu-
tionality of resign and run provisions. Nevertheless, both groups of
cases find impermissible any state provisions that completely bar or
disqualify individuals from running for Congress. Amendments that
completely bar candidates unconstitutionally modify the Qualifica-
tions Clause. Term limits initiatives would completely bar candidates
from running for Congress. They are, therefore, unconstitutional, and
the courts should strike them down.
IV. CONCLUSION
Congressional term limits are inconsistent with original intent, and
therefore, they raise the likelihood that an amendment is necessary to
enact them. Furthermore, past amendments reveal that the amend-
ment process has been deemed an appropriate way to enact substan-
tive changes to the electoral process. Term limits will produce
substantial changes in the electoral process. Therefore, an amendment
is an appropriate way to enact congressional term limits. Finally, case
law indicates that congressional term limits constitute an additional
qualification for service in Congress. The courts have struck down
other attempts at imposing additional qualifications for congressional
service. They should likewise strike down this latest attempt to
rewrite the Constitution by means of the initiative process. The courts
150. See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
151. See supra note 111.
152. See supra notes 84, 110 and accompanying text.
153. See supra notes 84-85, 109-10 and accompanying text.
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have indicated that additional qualifications can only be added if the
Constitution is amended. An amendment, therefore, is the only con-
stitutionally permissible way to enact congressional term limits.
Brendan Barnicle
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